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ABBREVIATIONS*
€ Euro
AIAF Asociación de Intermediarios de Activos Financieros (Association of Securities Dealers)
ATA Average total assets
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BIS Bank for International Settlements
bn Billions
bp Basis points
CBE Banco de España Circular
CBSO Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCR Banco de España Central Credit Register
CDS Credit default swaps
CEIOPS Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors
CIs Credit institutions
CNMV Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (National Securities Market Commission)
CPSS Basel Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
DIs Deposit institutions
ECB European Central Bank
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EU European Union
FSA Financial Services Authority
FSAP Financial System Assessment Program
FSR Financial Stability Report
FVCs Financial Vehicle Corporations
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GVA Gross value added
GVAmp Gross value added at market prices
IAS International Accounting Standards
ICO Instituto Oficial de Crédito (Official Credit Institute)
ID Data obtained from individual financial statements
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IMF International Monetary Fund
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions 
LGD Loss given default
m Millions
MEFF Mercado Español de Futuros y Opciones (Spanish Financial Futures and Options Market)
MiFID Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
MMFs Money market funds
NPISHs Non-profit institutions serving households
PD Probability of default
PER Price Earnings Ratio
pp Percentage points
ROA Return on assets
ROE Return on equity
RWA Risk-weighted assets
SCIs Specialised credit institutions
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SPV Special-purpose vehicle
TA Total assets
VaR Value at risk
WTO World Trade Organisation
* The latest version of the explanatory notes and of the glossary can be found in the November 2006 edition of the 
 Financial Stability Report.
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Introduction
Since the publication of the last Financial Stability Report (FSR), economic activity worldwide 
and in Spain has held at a high growth rate, while certain prevailing global risks have eased. 
The international financial system has shown notable resilience in the face of specific adverse 
episodes. Currently, however, certain challenges remain. These include most notably substan-
tial global imbalances, geopolitical risks and those relating to potential changes in the current 
perception of the level of risk, and the growing degree of leverage of hedge funds and of pri-
vate equity transactions.
The favourable economic situation throughout 2006 allowed Spanish deposit institutions to 
pursue their activity in a benign setting. The trends identified in previous editions of the FSR 
have remained in place, and credit to the private sector continues to show signs of accelerat-
ing. Nonetheless, some change is perceptible in the pattern of recent years, since financing to 
households, especially for house purchases, is slowing. And the growth in credit to corpora-
tions, in both construction and real estate development as well as in other activities, is step-
ping up.
As might be expected, even in a favourable economic setting, doubtful assets are increasing 
following the strong growth in credit in recent years. This increase is also in response to the 
new accounting Circular (CBE 4/2004), since doubtful assets are now recognised earlier and 
in a higher proportion. In sum, the rise in doubtful assets should be seen as a natural process 
of greater convergence towards the levels in other banking systems in peer countries.
Doubtful assets ratios remain at very low levels, in particular when compared with those of other 
developed banking systems. The comparison is all the more favourable in the mortgage lending 
segment, particularly when set against the US market as a whole. The low levels of doubtful as-
sets ratios largely attest to the favourable performance of the Spanish economy in recent years, 
but they also highlight the fact that there is little scope for further reductions in these ratios. 
Against a background in which the strong rate of expansion of credit were to ease, it would be 
reasonable to expect that the trend of these ratios would progressively be reversed.
The strong growth in economic activity and the diminished buoyancy of financing raised by 
households and firms through traditional bank borrowing obliges institutions to resort to the 
capital and interbank markets. This trend, which is not new, entails greater pressure on institu-
tions’ financial costs and on their liquidity risk management.
In the course of 2006, Spanish deposit institutions were able to shore up their income state-
ments, the first line of defence against the potential materialisation of a more adverse scenario, 
despite the adverse impact of tax changes on results. The resilience observable in the main 
margins of the income statement, even stripping out the positive effect arising on the sales of 
certain holdings, is related to greater activity and to the increase in efficiency.
The markets’ assessment of the main Spanish groups confirms the foregoing, corroborating 
the strength of the sector in Spain. What is more, according to market indicators the evaluation 
of Spanish groups is in line with that for the main European and US groups.
However, in a less favourable setting, some of the efficiency gains might be forgone. And, at 
the same time, if the growth rate of activity slows, there might be a more moderate increase in 
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earnings. The increase in profitability is partly related to the slight rise in the risk profile and to 
some change in the composition of regulatory capital. It is in such benign environments, in 
which institutions see their earnings boosted thanks to developments in activity, that compla-
cency should be avoided and watchfulness over costs maintained, stepping up flexibility in 
order to withstand any potential deterioration in efficiency.
Against a background in which the strong growth of activity has pushed capital requirements 
up, both the total and tier 1 solvency ratios stand significantly above the regulatory minimum 
levels, which testifies to the strength of the banking sector in Spain. Moreover, the stress ex-
ercises performed confirm the notable resilience of Spanish institutions at present.
This strength is also shared by insurance companies, which evidence high profitability and 
high solvency margins. That indicates that the sector is in a position to face the risks arising 
from market developments and the risks inherent in their business, along with challenges over 
the medium-term horizon, such as the introduction of IFRS and Solvency II.
Other financial market participants that — without having undergone particular pressures since 
the last FSR — are subject to monitoring owing to their significance are hedge funds, although 
their relative weight in Spain is currently limited. Nonetheless, the growth in assets managed 
internationally, their opaqueness and the high degree of leverage with which they operate all 
add, despite the possibilities of risk diversification these funds offer, further elements of uncer-
tainty.
The stability of financial systems depends largely on the infrastructure underpinning them, and 
on the regulations that affect them. In this respect, developments such as Target2 or the MiFID 
will be viewed as important by the financial markets in the near future.
At the time of this FSR going to press, there was a correction in the listed prices of certain 
companies linked to the Spanish real estate sector. It would not seem this process will signifi-
cantly affect Spanish deposit institutions, given their limited exposure to market risk and, in 
particular, to the volatility of stock market prices in the short term. In the medium run, these 
institutions continue to display very high earnings and capital-generating capacity and, there-
fore, resilience in the face of unexpected domestic and international shocks. It is highly likely 
that the central scenario will continue to be a mild and progressive change of business model 
from the real estate segment to others, in step with a macroeconomic scenario marked by a 
slowdown in house prices and in real estate activity to the benefit of investment in capital 
goods and exports.
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1 Macroeconomic risks and financial markets
Since the publication of the last FSR, international economic activity has been highly buoyant 
and expectations of robust growth in 2007 have firmed, with more balanced growth across the 
various areas. Also, inflationary pressures have remained contained, despite the high level of 
capacity utilisation and lax credit conditions. Against this background, the Spanish economy 
has posted high rates of growth, which have continued to benefit from the generous financial 
conditions, despite these being slightly tightened in 2006. Such conditions, in turn, have given 
rise to the growth in household and corporate debt and, therefore, in the net borrowing of the 
country as a whole.
Also, some of the global risks to continuing financial stability identified in previous reports have 
eased. These risks include that of further oil price increases and the pass-though of the slow-
down in activity in the construction sector in the United States to the economy as a whole, with 
contagious effects on other economies. Likewise of note has been the scant impact of certain 
crisis episodes during this period, such as the heavy losses suffered by the hedge fund Ama-
ranth in late August 2006, the collapse of the Thai stock exchange in December in response 
to the imposition of controls on capital inflows into the country, and the financial crises in Ec-
uador and Venezuela. Similarly, the bout of global financial turbulence in late February 2007, 
which saw sharp increases in volatilities and significant falls in the prices of the highest risk 
assets, did not adversely affect the balance of risks to financial stability either, insofar as it 
seems to have contained elements correcting factors that might have given rise to an exces-
sive appetite for risk. That said, the persistence of risks which, were they to arise, would have 
a negative impact on the normal functioning of the Spanish financial system, should not be 
obscured by these favourable developments.
Despite the positive developments in economic activity, substantial external imbalances persist 
without any significant indication that they are tending to be corrected. In the United States, the 
downward adjustment of residential investment and the slackness of non-residential investment 
in 2006 Q4 exacerbated the dependence of the country’s economic growth on private con-
sumption (Charts 1.1.A and B). As a result, developments in the US economy and the resilience 
of its growth in the face of the poor performance of construction activity depended on the con-
tinuation of negative household saving ratios, which makes correction of the external deficit 
without a further slowdown in growth less likely. Against this background the contribution of fis-
cal policy was hardly decisive. Significantly, the reduction in the external deficit observed in late 
2006 was as a result of oil price developments and, a little worryingly, of moderation in imports 
of capital goods, not of any correction of the domestic saving deficit in the United States.
There are no signs pointing to a disorderly correction of these imbalances, although their per-
sistence does not contribute to correcting the dependence of global growth on the United 
States, or to a change in the pattern of international capital flows, which are highly influenced 
by this situation. Any sharper-than-expected adjustment would, however, particularly impact 
those countries which, like Spain, depend to a greater extent on external saving to finance 
their expenditure decisions.
Following a period of strong pressures which took oil prices to an all-time high in August, there 
was a heavy reduction from September. Combined with the fall-off in other commodities pric-
es, this contributed notably to containing inflationary pressures. The fact there is some room 
to raise oil production allowed the price to react less energetically to the shocks on both the 
The world and Spanish 
economies have continued 
to grow at a sound pace...
… and some of the risks 
identified in previous reports 
have eased.
However, certain global 
imbalances persist …
… alongside geopolitical 
risks relating to 
developments in 
commodities prices.
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supply and demand sides and saw it settle to some extent at around $60 per barrel. Nonethe-
less, robust global growth means the demand for oil will remain high, against a background 
marked by continuing factors of geopolitical uncertainty regarding the course of commodities 
prices. The risk of a rise in inflation rates greater than that being discounted by the markets 
thus persists and, if it materialises, it would surely oblige the monetary authorities to tighten 
their policy stance.
On international financial markets, asset risk premia, especially those for the highest risk in-
struments, have moved in recent years on a declining profile, reaching very low levels in his-
torical terms (see Charts 1.2.A and B). Behind this, firstly, is the lesser uncertainty perceived 
by agents, as shown by the behaviour of implied volatilities on most financial instruments. That 
is in response, no doubt, to structural factors, the growing globalisation of markets and im-
proved central bank monetary policy conduct, on one hand, and to other, more cyclical factors 
such as the favourable macroeconomic conditions. However, it cannot be ruled out that the 
changes in premia are also due to some reduction in the return demanded by investors to 
offset the incurrence of a given amount of risk. Against this backdrop, it is particularly difficult 
to anticipate how the markets may be affected by different types of shocks bearing either on 
the current perception of the level of risk or on the assessment of such risk by the various 
agents involved. Once again, however, it seems reasonable to expect risks will be more marked 
for those countries that resort to a greater extent to foreign saving.
Ongoing financial innovation in the field of risk diversification adds a further element of com-
plexity. On one hand there are new products, such as credit derivatives, which make for more 
efficient management of such risks and, therefore, increase the system’s resilience in the face 
of adverse shocks. On the other hand, however, the proliferation of agents, the growth of over-
the-counter trading and the inherent technical complexity of the new instruments make it dif-
ficult to know with accuracy how risks are distributed among the various market participants 
and, therefore, what the overall results of specific shocks may be. Of particular note in this 
respect is the strong growth of assets managed by hedge funds, whose positive effects on 
diversification possibilities and on the profitability of international portfolios should not mask 
Agents might, moreover, 
reconsider the return they 
demand for assuming risks.
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the fact that their traditional opaqueness and the consequent difficulties of evaluating these 
holdings factor in a further unwanted element of uncertainty. Also notorious are the problems 
in identifying which portion of the increases in the relative weight of foreign assets held by 
certain agents is actually the result of a risk diversification exercise and which the result of 
more speculative activities, such as carry trade1.
The international financial markets have been affected in recent months by various shocks 
which, ultimately, have not had a significant bearing on the risk premia demanded. But other, 
new shocks have arisen, such as that associated with defaults in the US subprime mortgage 
market. In principle, the size of this market and its eminently local nature should contribute to 
restricting the scale of this shock internationally. However, regard must be had to the coupling 
of this market to the buoyancy of US real estate market activity and, through this channel, to 
US growth developments and, therefore, to some of the aforementioned global imbalances.
The year 2006 saw strong growth in corporate mergers and acquisitions which were largely 
financed via greater resort to debt. This development has been on a global scale and is due, 
among other fundamental factors, to robust economic growth and favourable corporate earn-
ings, against a background of generous corporate lending conditions. In Europe, bank inter-
mediation in these deals has been significant and merits close monitoring of lending and of the 
extent to which the risks have actually fed through to a broad set of investors. While a portion 
of these mergers and acquisitions has been financed through private equity2, the necessary 
funds for the bulk of them have been provided through debt issues, especially for the large-
volume operations, with a significant participation by institutional investors. The nature of this 
debt has been varied, but debt with a higher proportion of repayment instalments scheduled 
towards the end of its life or debt bearing a fixed interest rate have become increasingly 
Financing a growing volume 
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prominent. Accordingly, a deterioration in the macroeconomic climate might entail a swift un-
winding of these activities and of the attendant outlook, with the risk of contagion to other debt 
instruments. Also pivotal is the stance of institutional investors; some (such as hedge funds) 
are highly dynamic and their participation is motivated by the search for high returns. Further, 
during the debt placement period, banks retain a portion of the risks associated with these 
operations, which are occasionally financed through bridge loans or with undertakings to pro-
vide project financing. Given the sizeable volume attained by operations of this type and the 
degree of leverage involved, some might not be successfully completed. In any event, if the 
international banks most involved in this type of business have structured their operations and 
diversified risks appropriately, an event in this market should not have a significant impact on 
the stability of the international financial system.
Spanish corporations have contributed most notably to the surge in mergers and acquisitions, 
with a volume in 2006 of close to €100 billion. This figure quadruples that of 2005 which, in 
turn, showed strong growth on the previous year. In Spain, moreover, a most sizeable portion 
of the funds needed has been provided by credit institutions through operations which, often, 
have taken the form of syndicated loans.
In recent years mortgage loans for house purchases have held at a high rate of increase which 
has become one of the main sources of expansion of banking business (see Chapter 2). How-
ever, the buoyancy of these loans has recently begun to ease, the slowdown being closely 
linked to the progressive normalisation of property market conditions. This move towards a 
normal footing can be seen both in house prices, the year-on-year growth rate of which has 
been on a clearly declining trend since late 2004, and in the changes in the number of mort-
gage transactions linked to residential property purchases (see Chart 1.3).
These changes make the prospect of a central scenario in which adjustments in this market 
proceed in a gradual and orderly fashion more realistic. As a result, the likelihood of alternative 
scenarios in which corrections were to take place in a less orderly fashion is limited, although 
this should not mask the fact that, throughout this process, Spanish credit institutions have 
considerably increased their exposure to developments in the domestic property market.
… which, in Spain, 
compound those stemming 
from house purchase loan 
developments.
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2 Deposit institutions and other financial market participants
As noted in Chapter 1, macroeconomic activity and financial market developments have gen-
erally been favourable since the last FSR, although certain risks persist. Against this back-
ground, the main participants in the Spanish financial markets took the opportunity in 2006 to 
strengthen their financial position, and this has helped mitigate the risks which they face. This 
chapter deals precisely with identifying those risks and assessing the resilience of the institu-
tions.
The consolidated balance sheets of Spanish deposit institutions show (Table 2.1) a brisk pace 
of activity (14.8%), albeit lower than in the previous year (23.2%). This lesser growth of assets 
is due to the performance of business abroad which, after various years of rapid expansion, 
has posted growth of 6%, partly as a result of the appreciation of the euro against the Latin 
American currencies.
Financing to the private sector is the main factor behind the growth of activity, while funding 
granted to general government decreased in relative weight. Indeed, the expansion of busi-
ness in Spain, where asset growth was 17.6%, is mainly explained by the performance of 
credit to the private sector, which has grown at a rate somewhat above 25%. Compared with 
December 2005, there is a slight slowdown in secured credit, which nonetheless is holding at 
a rate of more than 27%, while other credit extended is picking up.
The 2006 consolidated level data reflect an acceleration of institutions’ doubtful assets, which 
have gone from a growth rate of 4.6% in December 2005 to the current one of 9.9%. This 
quickening is due to the doubtful assets of business in Spain, where they are growing at 
13.9%. However, this growth of doubtful assets has not passed through to the doubtful as-
sets ratios, which remain at record low levels, partly due to the rate at which activity is grow-
ing.
Deposits from the private sector have grown at 13.6%, which is below the growth rate of fi-
nancing to this sector, and this has obliged institutions to resort to the international markets to 
finance their credit expansion (mainly via issues of marketable securities and subordinated 
debt). These sources of financing are more costly and probably more volatile. However, own 
funds grew by 17.6% and their weight in total assets has remained around 5%.
As a result of the performance of foreign business, the weight of financial assets abroad has 
decreased slightly (by 1.3 pp) to 21.9% of total assets. The tendency of financial assets abroad 
to be increasingly located in geographical areas less prone to potential bouts of instability and, 
generally, the favourable economic situation of the world economy, mean that the risk profile 
of financial assets abroad continues to be very low (Charts 2.1.A and B).
In short, analysis of the consolidated balance sheets of Spanish deposit institutions shows that 
the main risks for them are associated with operations in Spain and, in particular, with develop-
ments in credit extension and doubtful assets.
Credit to the resident private sector in business in Spain continued to accelerate in 2006 
(25.9% in December) due to the strong growth of lending to the corporate sector (30.3%), in 
a setting marked by the positive performance of economic activity. Lending to households, 
however, showed signs of a slowdown in the second half of the year, particularly that for house 
2.1 Deposit institutions
2.1.1 BANKING RISKS
Financing to the private 
sector is the main factor 
explaining asset growth.
The growth of doubtful 
assets has not passed 
through to the doubtful 
assets ratio …
… and the risk profile of 
business abroad is 
decreasing.
Lending to households has 
slowed, but not that to 
corporations …
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purchases (Chart 2.2.A). Nevertheless, both types of credit continued to grow rapidly (at near-
ly 22%). These developments signal a certain change of pattern with respect to recent years, 
in which lending to households outpaced corporate credit.
In the corporate credit segment, lending for construction and property development quick-
ened further, reaching a rate of 44.8% at end-2006, but so did that for other business activi-
ties, with growth of 18.6%, up 8 pp on December 2005. Lending for construction and, in 
particular, that for property development, continued to grow strongly (33% and 50%, respec-
tively), even accelerating in the second half of 2006. However, this may reflect the new projects 
… both in construction and 
property development
and in other sectors.
ASSETS DEC-06
(% CHANGE)
DEC-06/
DEC-05
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
DEC-05
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
DEC-06
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Cash and balances with central banks 49,219 6.1 1.8 1.7
Loans and advances to credit institutions 244,407 9.9 8.8 8.5
General government 50,526 -3.7 2.1 1.7
Other private sectors 1,909,638 24.8 60.8 66.1
Debt securities 326,009 -16.4 15.5 11.3
Other equity instruments 103,042 33.2 3.1 3.6
Investments 27,803 -2.8 1.1 1.0
Derivatives 72,506 -0.6 2.9 2.5
Tangible assets 36,387 4.8 1.4 1.3
Other (a) 68,828 12.7 2.4 2.4
TOTAL ASSETS 2,888,365 14.8 100 100
Memorandum items:
Financing to the private sector 1,998,619 22.9 64.7 69.2
Financing to general government 203,443 -22.7 10.5 7.0
Total doubtful assets 15,219 9.9 0.6 0.5
Total doubtful assets ratio 0.61
Provisions for bad debts and country risk 35,595 17.1 1.2 1.2
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY DEC-06
(% CHANGE)
DEC-06/
DEC-05
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
DEC-05
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
DEC-06
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Balances from central banks 43,400 -24.1 2.3 1.5
Deposits from credit institutions 437,760 1.9 17.1 15.2
General government 77,562 14.8 2.7 2.7
Other private sectors 1,304,883 13.6 45.7 45.2
Marketable debt securities 545,881 43.7 15.1 18.9
Derivatives 79,139 16.9 2.7 2.7
Subordinated debt 70,871 14.5 2.5 2.5
Provisions 36,842 0.8 1.5 1.3
Other (a) 118,037 1.1 4.6 4.1
TOTAL LIABILITIES 2,714,375 14.7 94.1 94.0
Minority interests 5,643 -9.2 0.2 0.2
Valuation adjustments 22,448 18.8 0.8 0.8
Own funds 145,899 17.6 4.9 5.1
TOTAL EQUITY 173,990 16.6 5.9 6.0
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 2,888,365 14.8 100 100
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET
Deposit institutions
TABLE 2.1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. The remaining assets and liabilities entries not explicitly considered, including 
valuation adjustments, are included in "Other".
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undertaken early by property developers in 2006 ahead of the entry into force of the new con-
struction quality regulations with the attendant higher costs.
The gradual slowdown in the rate of change of house prices, along with the progressive rise in 
interest rates (175 bp in the euro area since end-2005), is in line with the recent trend in house 
purchase lending (Chart 1.3), and contrasts with the developments in credit to the commercial 
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real estate sector (Chart 2.2.B). This decoupling, if it persists over time and is accompanied by 
a marked slowdown in economic growth, will constitute a risk factor for the Spanish financial 
system. Historically, construction and property development loans have shown the highest 
default rate of all corporate credit, as noted in previous FSRs.
The pick-up in construction and property development lending continues to raise the sectoral 
concentration of institutions’ loan portfolios (Chart 2.3.A). In December 2006 nearly half the 
corporate loans (49%) of all deposit institutions were to construction firms (17%) and property 
developers (32%). However, the relative weight of house purchase loans has decreased slight-
ly.
The growth of lending to property developers is not evenly spread among the institutions 
(Chart 2.3.B). First, there is a numerous group of institutions with little or no activity in this busi-
ness segment. Second, there is another group of institutions with high growth rates. In any 
event, these two groups of instutitions both have a very small share of total lending to the 
resident private sector and, in particular, of lending to property developers. Third, there are 
somewhat more than 50 institutions, accounting for a very high (nearly 75%) share of business 
with property developers and two-thirds of total lending to residents, whose business growth 
is concentrated around an average rate of 50%.
Recent years have seen a growing trend towards an increase in the relative weight of larger 
credit transactions. Thus lending has grown at 5 pp per year since 2003 as a result of transac-
tions exceeding €5 million (Chart 2.4.A). Excluding transactions above €30 million, corporate 
credit accelerated in 2006 from 14% to 17.9%, which is less than the effective change (from 
20.1% to 26.3%).
In general, credit risk varies inversely with transaction size (Chart 2.4.B). In 2006 the default 
ratios (number of doubtful loans as a percentage of total loans) were at their lowest level for 
the last 20 years in all size groups, and they were all very similar (around 0.5%), except for 
Credit concentration has 
risen in lending to real estate 
companies and decreased 
in house purchase lending.
The pick-up in corporate 
credit is related to larger 
transactions …
… which generally entail 
less credit risk.
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transactions of less than €1 million (95.5% of the total transactions by number and 29% by 
volume), which had a ratio of 1.6%. Risk exposures in the over-€500 million group (0.001% of 
transactions by number and 2.9% by volume) have not shown any default in the last 20 years, 
as a result of the careful scrutiny to which these transactions are subjected and of the quality 
of the borrowers. A significant portion of these transactions is usually subsequently assigned 
to others through the syndication process.
A very small part of bank lending to residents is extended in currencies other than the euro. 
Thus in 2006 around 0.3% of mortgage loans to individuals and 0.2% of other loans to indi-
viduals were denominated in other currencies, mainly Swiss francs (two-thirds of mortgages 
and nearly half of the others) and yen (one-third and nearly half, respectively)1. The interest rate 
spread between the euro, Swiss franc and yen, and the movements in the euro exchange rate 
against these currencies (stability of the Swiss franc and the trend depreciation of the yen) 
have stimulated the appetite for debt in these currencies. However, the risks associated with 
transactions of this type are higher (exchange risk for the customer and reputational risk for the 
institutions marketing the debt).
Concurrently with the strong growth of on-balance-sheet lending, the last few years have also 
seen a significant increase in credit lines (Chart 2.5.A). From the perspective of a broad time 
horizon (Chart 2.5.B), at aggregate level for total corporate credit, the utilisation ratio (ratio of 
amount drawn down to the sum of the amounts drawn and undrawn) has shown cyclical be-
haviour, rising to 80% in 1992 and subsequently falling to a low of 72% in 2004.
Simple correlation analysis shows that, in general, this utilisation ratio led the slowdown in activ-
ity and the rise in doubtful assets. Behind this behaviour lies the greater use of credit lines by 
The volume of lending to 
households in currencies 
other than the euro is very 
limited.
The use of credit lines by 
firms has increased.
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rest basically in Swiss francs and yen.
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firms trying to guard against possible future liquidity constraints in economic downturns, and 
this behaviour becomes more marked as the probability of corporate default increases. Adding 
to this is the more prudent attitude of banks as they reduce the amounts drawable by their 
more risky customers. The direct relationship between the utilisation ratio and an increase, with 
a certain lag, in doubtful assets has not been observed in this decade, which has been charac-
terised by a significant change in the utilisation ratio and a highly stable doubtful assets ratio.
The strong lending growth in business in Spain in recent years is, as expected, giving rise to an 
increase in doubtful assets (Chart 2.6.A), given the traditional lag between these two variables, 
and despite the favourable performance of economic activity. A higher volume of loans in de-
posit institutions’ portfolios translates into higher doubtful assets if default probabilities remain 
constant. As has been pointed out in recent FSRs, this increase is partly due to changes in ac-
counting rules, which require doubtful assets to be recognised earlier and in a higher proportion. 
In addition, the behaviour of doubtful assets will become more volatile (Box 2.1). The figures re-
calculated by the institutions in accordance with the new accounting criteria since December 
2004 show a progressive quickening of the rate of change of doubtful assets (Chart 2.6.B), which 
grew by 12% in December 2006 (14% for corporate and household doubtful assets).
Of the business segments, house purchase lending showed the highest year-on-year increase 
in doubtful assets (34.1%), followed by other lending to households (17.2%) and credit to prop-
erty developers (16.3%), although its course is highly erratic and partly attributable to the strong 
expansion of credit (Chart 2.6.A). By contrast, doubtful assets in corporate credit, particularly if 
construction firms and property developers are excluded, are growing very slowly, at 4.6% and 
1.6% in December 2006, respectively. Hence the business segments that have grown most 
rapidly in recent years are naturally those that show the highest rise in doubtful assets.
As a result of the combination of generally moderate growth in doubtful assets and strong 
credit expansion, the doubtful assets ratios of the business segments continued to decrease 
As was to be expected, 
following the strong growth 
of credit volume, doubtful 
assets are increasing ...
… partly due also to the 
new accounting rules,…
… although the doubtful 
assets ratios continue to fall, ...
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during 2006. The exception to this behaviour is, as mentioned in previous FSRs, the upward 
trend of the doubtful assets ratio of consumer credit (Chart 2.7.A). This, together with the al-
most imperceptible increase in the doubtful assets ratio of house purchase lending to house-
holds (4 bp, from 0.36% to 0.4%), meant that in December 2006 the doubtful assets ratio of 
corporate credit was, for the first time, less than that of household lending. Also contributing 
to this was the aforementioned change in the pattern of lending growth.
As regards risk categories, in business in Spain the order of their doubtful assets ratios coincides 
with the qualitative assessment of their risk level. Consumer finance, particularly that extended 
via credit cards or current account overdrafts, is the business segment with the highest level of 
risk. Although the doubtful assets of the low and medium-low risk classes (credit backed by 
collateral that fully covers the outstanding exposure) only account for around 40% of total doubt-
ful assets, their contribution to the growth of these was highly significant in December 2006.
At international level, the doubtful asset ratios of Spanish institutions are among the lowest 
(Box 2.2). In this respect, the doubtful assets ratios of mortgage lending to households in the 
Spanish market contrast markedly with those of such lending in the US market, where the 
subprime2 segment differs greatly from the rest of the mortgage market (Chart 2.7.B).
In addition to the marked differences in the level of total doubtful assets between the US and 
Spanish mortgage markets and in the requirements to document mortgage transactions that 
have to be met by Spanish instutitions under the rigorous Spanish mortgage market regula-
tions, it should be noted that the current proportion of mortgage loans in Spain to individuals 
who at some time in the past have failed to meet their credit obligations is very small (1.27%). 
Moreover, although the doubtful assets ratio for mortgage loans is higher among foreign resi-
… and are well below the 
ratios in other countries.
…, particularly in mortgage 
lending, ....
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dents, its level of 1.4% is very low, and even below the doubtful assets ratio in the consumer 
credit segment. Finally, the available information on the delinquency of the new mortgage 
loans granted in late 2005 and in 2006 does not show that they are performing any worse than 
those granted in the previous three years (default rates around 0.04% or 0.07%, measured six 
months or one year after loan origination, respectively), so the Spanish market does not seem 
to suffer the problems of adverse selection detected in the US subprime market.
The doubtful assets ratios in Spain reflect the favourable course of the Spanish economy in 
recent years and, at the same time, indicate that no additional decreases in these ratios can 
be expected. On the contrary, given the strong growth of the volume of credit, with the logical 
and consequent increase in doubtful assets, it can reasonably be expected that, even in a 
benign economic environment, these ratios would grow if there were a slowdown in credit 
… although it can be 
expected that the 
downward trend will 
progressively reverse.
DIFFERENCES IN THE ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF DOUBTFUL ASSETS UNDER CBE 4/2004
AND UNDER CBE 4/1991
BOX 2.1
Banco de España Circular (CBE) 4/2004 considers that all the out-
standing amount of a transaction must be classified as doubtful 
once three months have elapsed from the first default. Thus CBE 
4/2004 has toughened the so-called transaction carryover effect, 
since its predecessor, CBE 4/1991, established that either of the 
following two conditions had to apply for this to occur: the accu-
mulated past-due amounts classified as doubtful due to arrears 
had to exceed 25% of the amount payable; or there had to be 
amounts past-due by more than 12 months (six months for mort-
gages and consumer credit). Hence one of the direct consequenc-
es of the application of the new Circular is an increase in the vol-
ume of credit institutions’ doubtful assets and in their doubtful 
assets ratios, as seen in recent FSRs.
A simulation analysis of a mortgage loan portfolio over the business 
cycle vindicates the foregoing observations. Note that the levels of 
the doubtful assets ratios and the differences between them are a 
result of the assumptions made in the simulations and need not nec-
essarily be related to the actual levels of current or future doubtful 
assets.
It has been assumed that an institution begins to grant mortgage 
loans in month t=0, so until three months have elapsed, no doubtful 
amounts will appear in its balance sheet. Also, the assumed default 
rate simulates cyclical behaviour by means of a progressive increase 
in defaults up to the end of the second year and a continuous de-
crease from the middle of the third year. Under these assumptions, 
Chart A shows that an institution will have a higher ratio of doubtful 
assets, since these will appear earlier in its balance sheet. Also, it 
confirms that the different classification of doubtful assets under the 
two Circulars produces differences in the doubtful assets ratio that 
become greater with increasing probability of default.
A similar study was conducted to analyse the impact of the new Cir-
cular on the volatility of the doubtful assets ratio. Assuming an envi-
ronment characterised by small shocks within a certain macroeco-
nomic stability, there were found to be moments of greater variability 
under CBE 4/2004 than under CBE 4/1991 (Chart B).
These results should be viewed with caution given that they depend 
on the assumptions used in the simulations on which they are based.
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extension. The new accounting framework will contribute further to accelerating this 
change.
The strong expansion of corporate and household lending (24.8% at consolidated level, Ta-
ble 2.1) has not been accompanied by similar growth in their bank deposits (13.6%). The 
competition from savings products developed in mutual and pension funds and insurance, 
which are largely marketed by the deposit institutions themselves, has obliged a growing 
number of institutions to resort to the capital and interbank markets to finance this process of 
credit expansion.
In addition to issuing marketable securities, institutions are increasingly resorting to the secu-
ritisation of their assets. Furthermore, at the end of 2006 the volume of covered bonds issued, 
including marketable ones, stood at 25% of the mortgage loan portfolio of deposit institutions. 
Other mortgage securitisations now represent 10% of the on-balance-sheet mortgage portfo-
lio. 2006 saw a convergence between the growth rates of covered bonds, which slowed, and 
those of securitisations (whether mortgage or non-mortgage), which picked up.
Asset securitisation enables the transfer of credit risk from banks to other investors. Banking 
supervisors, including the Banco de España, regard these developments positively because 
they help to diversify risk. Indeed, institutions should consider the possibility offered to them by 
the current regulatory environment and the current conditions in financial markets to transfer 
the risk accumulated in the retained first loss tranches of previous securitisations. The new 
international rules issued by the BCBS will be more stringent in this respect.
The uneven growth of lending and traditional deposits, and the readier access to international 
markets, mean that liquidity risk management is increasingly important for institutions, espe-
cially when currencies other than the euro are involved. According to their level of activity and 
degree of internationalisation, Spanish credit institutions have responded by improving the as-
sessment of their liquidity needs, formulating stress scenarios and contingency plans and es-
tablishing limits and internal controls. In operations that involve currencies other than the euro, 
The lower growth of 
deposits induces institutions 
to turn to the markets, …
… to securitise assets and 
issue covered bonds …
… which adds to the 
importance of liquidity risk 
management.
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especially currencies of emerging countries, the management of liquidity risk is decentralised 
(by country and currency), although the policy guidelines on liquidity, controls, limits, etc. are 
centrally co-ordinated. Finally, it should be pointed out that in the international debate between 
banking supervisors there is a broad consensus on the scant effectiveness of quantitative 
regulations for controlling liquidity risk and on the need to promote best banking practices in 
this respect.
As noted in previous FSRs, the income statement of Spanish deposit institutions discloses a 
solid position. In 2006, even disregarding the positive effect deriving from the sale of holdings 
by certain institutions, both the net income and the main margins showed notable growth.
The group net income of Spanish deposit institutions grew by 33.6%3 (Table 2.2). As a result, 
the return on assets (ROA) before taxes and after taxes increased notably to stand at 1.44% 
(up 25 bp) and 1.03% (up 14 bp), respectively. This last figure is particularly notable given that 
the decrease in the corporate income tax rate, since it affected deferred tax assets and liabili-
ties, had a negative impact on results (higher corporate income tax charge).The ROE was up 
from 16.6% to 19.6%, rising across-the-board in deposit institutions (Chart 2.8.A).
The improved ROE in 2006 (Chart II.1.8.B) was made possible by the greater efficiency with 
which institutions operated4. However, the profitability gains were also attributable to a shift in 
the composition of regulatory own funds towards preference shares and tier 2 capital, and to 
a certain increase in the risk profile despite lower gearing.
The increase in net interest income is explained by the strong performance of financial reve-
nue, particularly that arising from customer lending. However, financial costs grew more 
2.1.2 PROFITABILITY
Profitability increased …
… as did the main margins …
 €m % CHANGE % ATA
DEC-06 DEC-06/DEC-05 DEC-05 DEC-06
Financial revenue 107,306 23.0 4.05 4.28
Financial costs 63,203 29.3 2.27 2.52
Net interest income 44,103 15.0 1.78 1.76
Share of profit or loss of entities accounted for using the equity method 4,580 28.4 0.17 0.18
Net commissions 20,023 13.3 0.82 0.80
Gains and losses on financial assets and liabilities 9,278 66.7 0.26 0.37
Gross income 77,984 19.7 3.02 3.11
Operating expenses 37,668 7.8 1.62 1.50
Other operating income 1,410 17.5 0.06 0.06
Net operating income 41,726 32.8 1.46 1.67
Asset impairment losses 8,724 38.3 0.29 0.35
Provisioning expense (net) 3,762 25.0 0.14 0.15
Other income (net) 6,665 91.5 0.16 0.27
Profit before tax 35,905 40.3 1.19 1.44
Net income 27,100 33.1 0.94 1.08
Memorandum item:
Group net income 25,717 33.6 0.89 1.03
INCOME STATEMENT
Deposit institutions
TABLE 2.2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
3. Exchange rate movements affected the income statement less than the balance sheet, since the change in the aver-
age rates was less pronounced. 4. For a detailed explanation of the breakdown of the ROE, see Box II.1 of the May 
2004 FSR.
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strongly, including those related to deposits and, in particular, those linked to the issuance of 
marketable securities. These developments, more noticeable in business in Spain, reflect the 
brisk pace of credit expansion and, therefore, the greater need for borrowing in the capital 
markets at a higher cost than in traditional business (Chart 2.9.A). The progressive rise in inter-
est rates during 2006 is passing through somewhat more rapidly to the marginal rate on liabil-
ities (Chart 2.9.B).
Gross income grew more rapidly than net interest income, partly due to the favourable earn-
ings performance of investees, evidencing the strength of corporate earnings. However, the 
main explanatory factor is the sharp increase in net gains on financial assets and liabilities 
thanks to the buoyancy of the financial markets in 2006 along with the sales of holdings by 
certain institutions.
For their part, net commissions grew moderately at a rate below the increase in activity. The 
easing of growth was apparent in all components, although particularly marked in those relat-
ing to collection and payment services (Chart 2.10.A). This was more noticeable in business in 
Spain, where they decreased, and the reason may be related to the growing competition in 
this business segment. This competition, and a comparison with the relative levels of fees and 
commissions in peer countries, seem to indicate that the contribution of this caption to earn-
ings is going to fall off once allowance has been made for the change in volume of activity.
Spanish institutions continued their efforts to achieve relatively moderate growth of operating 
expenses (up by 7.8%, but down in terms of ATA). This led to a significant improvement in the 
efficiency ratio from 53.6% to 48.3%, in line with a general pattern prevailing in the sector and, 
in particular, in the larger institutions (Chart 2.10.B). This behaviour of operating expenses was 
why net operating income expanded so strongly. However, part of this increase in efficiency is 
related to the sharp increase in activity and, therefore, has a significant conjunctural compo-
nent. A slowdown in credit growth would raise the pressure of fixed costs on the income state-
ment and hence increase the need to further improve efficiency.
… largely due to the relative 
containment of operating 
expenses, which can be 
attributed partly to 
circumstantial factors.
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Loan loss provisioning grew by nearly 40%, against a background of rising doubtful assets and, 
at the same time, of strong credit expansion, which led to higher general provisioning charges. 
Other provisioning increased at a lower pace (25%), due to retirement provisioning by certain 
large institutions. In contrast, the results on sales of holdings almost doubled their contribution.
The market indicators available for the main Spanish institutions confirm their soundness and 
provide an assessment in line with that for the main European banking groups. The recent 
publication by the IMF of its financial robustness indicators confirms this (Box 2.2).
The stock market prices of the large groups are bullish, while the associated volatility has re-
mained steady for both Spanish and European institutions. The betas, calculated with respect 
to the DJ Stoxx 50 index, have risen for the main European banking groups and, to a lesser 
extent, for the main Spanish ones, although the latter continue to hold around unity.
Credit default swaps (CDS) indicate that the risk incurred by deposit institutions continues to 
be perceived as very low and unchanged since the previous FSR (Chart 2.11.A). Moreover, the 
credit ratings of the main European banking groups have been high and stable (with some 
improvement) during the past year (Chart 2.11.C). This chart also shows the expectations of 
stock market analysts. The buy recommendations for all but three institutions stand at above 
Market information confirms 
the soundness of Spanish 
institutions …
FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS INDICATORS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND BOX 2.2
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has recently published a list of 
financial soundness indicators for a sample of 40 countries. The ac-
companying table compares the situation of credit institutions in 
Spain with that in a selection of seven EU and US economies. The 
general balance is relatively satisfactory for Spain.
The geographical distribution of the financing granted by Spanish 
institutions reveals an intermediate position, with one-third of credit 
being extended abroad, although only 10% was in emerging coun-
tries. The proportion of deposits to total customer loans is in line 
with that of other countries. The low interest rates and the strong 
credit growth have led to funds being raised on the European capital 
markets.
Spanish institutions show high profitability in terms of ROE and ROA, 
as a result of a high degree of efficiency and despite having the low-
est asset-liability interest rate spread. This latter indicator reflects a 
higher level of competition in the Spanish banking market. Spain is 
also distinguished by staff costs accounting for a higher share of op-
erating expenses, partly due to the retail banking model adopted by 
Spanish institutions and to the public’s preference for personal atten-
tion in financial services.
Finally, a look at the main solvency indicators, i.e. the total and tier 1 
capital ratios, shows that Spanish institutions occupy an intermediate 
position, although the low volume of doubtful assets is fully covered 
by provisions. The doubtful assets ratio is also very low.
Geographical distribution of credit ES DE UK FR IT NL PT US
Domestic economy 66.2 75.2 50.7 57.0 86.0 35.2 79.2 86.2
Advanced economies 24.3 21.6 42.2 32.0 10.9 59.8 15.0 10.5
Emerging economies 9.5 3.2 7.1 11.0 3.1 5.0 5.8 3.2
Ratio of deposits to loans 77.6 71.9 62.2 78.9 66.5 76.3 70.4 107.1
ROA 0.95 0.48 1.12 0.50 0.74 0.49 0.93 1.61
ROE 16.9 13.9 17.3 14.4 14.0 16.0 15.5 17.7
Loan deposits spread 2.3 3.5 3.0 3.7 3.2 3.1
Efficiency ratio 50.9 61.0 56.8 64.3 60.5 67.7 62.1
Staff costs as a proportion of operating expenses 59.2 55.1 47.9 58.3 58.1 51.0 54.8 45.0
Total solvency ratio 12.4 12.2 12.8 11.4 10.0 12.6 11.4 12.8
Tier I solvency ratio 8.0 8.0 8.9 8.3 7.3 10.3 6.9 10.7
Doubtful credits net of specific provisions as a proportion of capital 0.04 35.00 7.50 8.70 36.60 5.00 5.20
Doubtful assets ratio 0.8 4.1 1.0 3.5 7.3 1.6 0.7
FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS INDICATORS: POSITION OF CREDIT INSTITUTIONS (2005)
Consolidated data (%)
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 30 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, MAY 2007
50%, while the sell recommendations generally do not exceed 10%. In other words, at the 
date of preparation of the FSR, the analysts agreed that there were opportunities for apprecia-
tion for the main European banking groups, including the two largest Spanish ones, in the 
medium-term.
The ratio between the market value of shares and the book value of own funds (known also as 
the Tobin q) indicates also the medium-term potential attributed by the market to the US and 
European banking sector. In this case, the outlook for the large Spanish institutions is more 
favourable than that of their European counterparts (Chart 2.11.B).
In sum, the soundness of the income statement of Spanish deposit institutions, as reflected by 
their high profitability and efficiency, and the good prospects reflected by the available market 
indicators, suggest that Spanish institutions have the capacity to react in the event that poten-
… which have an income 
statement able to cope with 
potential difficulties.
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tial difficulties should crystallise. However, it cannot be ruled out that, if the favourable eco-
nomic situation were to change, a part of the institutions’ improvements in efficiency might 
unravel. Moreover, if the growth of activity were to slow, this would have a significant impact 
on the growth rate of earnings.
The solvency ratios of deposit institutions in 2006 remained well above the minimum require-
ment of 8% and held very steady, both under Spanish regulations and under Basel rules5 
(Chart 2.12.A). Hence applying the more prudent Spanish rules, this ratio increased slightly by 
12 bp to 11.2%, whereas under Basel rules it lost 8 bp to stand at 11.9%. The tier 1 ratio 
decreased markedly (66 bp), although it still remains high (7.2%). The individual-level analysis 
of the solvency ratio shows that a large number of institutions have raised this ratio from below 
11% to around 13% (Chart 2.12.B).
The sustained growth of banking activity in 2006 led risk-weighted assets to increase by 
21.4%. The greater buoyancy of lending meant that the requirements arising from credit risk 
accelerated by 2.2 pp to 22.2%, driven by both mortgage assets and consumer and corpo-
rate credit, which raised the risk profile of assets (ratio of risk weighted assets to total assets) 
to 67.3%, up 3.6 pp on 2005.
Regarding own funds, the growth of both tier 1 and tier 2 capital slowed significantly. The 
growth rate of tier 1 capital dropped from 21.1% to 11.2%, explaining the fall in the tier 1 ratio, 
while tier 2 capital slowed by 23 pp to grow by 33.3%. Deductions were smaller, so their con-
tribution was positive (Chart 2.13.A).
The increase in tier 1 capital largely came from the favourable performance of earnings, which 
were used to strengthen institutions’ reserves (growth of 14.2%). Preference shares increased 
by 1.4%, while goodwill grew by 17.3%. The growth of tier 2 capital was due to two factors: 
first, the growth of subordinated debt and of asset revaluation reserves, which include a part 
of the cumulative gains on holdings in companies, in a year of highly favourable stock market 
performances; second, the entry into force of CBE 2/2006 enabled a large number of institu-
tions to include a portion of their general provisions as tier 2 capital for the first time in 2006 
(Chart 2.13.B). Finally, deductions from own funds decreased by 27.4% as a result of divest-
ments of insurance companies.
Bank regulators attribute growing importance to the role to be played by investors in control-
ling the level of risk of the deposit institutions of which they are the shareholders, holders of 
preference shares, subordinated debt or other debt securities, and depositors of a certain 
size. Evidence of this is Pillar 3 of Basel II. If investors have more information on the risk in-
curred by institutions and these know that their decisions will be assessed more accurately, 
there will be a closer alignment of institutions’ risk with the cost of the funds obtained by them 
or with the asset prices negotiated and, accordingly, in the return/risk trade-off of investors.
Preference shares and subordinated debt are two instruments that may contribute to strength-
ening market discipline. However, for this discipline to be effective, certain requirements must be 
met. Among these is the need for the firm to be listed in a sufficiently liquid and deep market.
The information available on preference shares and subordinated debt issued by com-
mercial and savings banks in recent years shows that the features of these issues have 
2.1.3 SOLVENCY
Solvency levels remain 
comfortably above the 
regulatory requirements, …
… risk-weighted assets 
grew substantially, moving 
in parallel with the credit 
expansion, …
… and own funds increased 
more moderately.
The nature of preference 
share and subordinated 
debt issues is changing …
… so as to reduce 
reputational risk …
… although they require 
more liquidity.
5. Spanish requirements are stricter than those of Basel because the Spanish rules specify that investments in insurance 
companies have to be deducted from own funds if they exceed 20% of the investee’s capital.
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changed significantly. These changes increase their power as an instrument of market 
discipline and, in addition, reduce the reputational risk of these institutions. In 2006, all 
preference share and subordinated debt issues of commercial banks and the great major-
ity of those of savings banks were targeted at the institutional segment, the risk premiums 
of which are traditionally higher than those of the retail segment. Also, a growing number 
of issues have a credit rating. This situation clearly contrasts with that at the beginning of 
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the decade, when retail placements predominated, especially in issues by savings banks, 
and ratings were rare. However, in regard to the degree of liquidity in the secondary mar-
ket in which they can be traded, progress has been much more modest. Thus the turnover 
(ratio of the amount traded to the amount listed) of subordinated debt on the AIAF market 
stands at around 0.3 (compared with 11.1 for public debt), while that of preference shares 
is still lower (around 0.1).
The distribution of credit losses of Spanish deposit institutions can be estimated from his-
torical data on the loans granted in the last two decades. This makes it possible to analyse 
how macroeconomic variables affect the proportion of defaults, the variation in the number 
of loans, and the loss that these defaults may cause institutions. Thus the impact that differ-
ent macroeconomic scenarios would have on the distribution of the cumulative losses over a 
three-year time horizon can be calculated. Initially, comparison of the estimated distribution of 
losses for 2005 and 2006 (Chart 2.14.A) shows a slight shift to the right and a flattening of this 
distribution, indicating a greater volume of expected and unexpected losses, which in turn was 
a result of increased lending activity.
A stress test was carried out to measure how the distribution of losses in 2006 is affected by 
four consecutive quarters of falls in GDP of a magnitude similar to those in the 1993 recession. 
It can be seen (Chart 2.14.A) that the loss distribution shifts significantly to the right, indicating 
a considerable increase in credit risk, to the point that the expected loss and the unexpected 
loss may reach twice their current values. Nevertheless, this shock would not jeopardise the 
strength of Spanish institutions, since these would be able to absorb comfortably the increase 
in losses through their provisions and other own funds.
From a different perspective, the credit risk exposure of Spanish deposit institutions to non-
financial corporations was analysed by calculating two types of leading indicators of this risk 
for 2007. Both indicators are constructed from estimates derived from a model which incorpo-
Stress testing …
… confirms the resilience of 
Spanish deposit institutions.
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rates the effect of changes in the business cycle through the inclusion of variations in GDP as 
an explanatory factor, along with the individual characteristics of the corporations. The projec-
tions for 2007 are based on stress testing which, ceteris paribus, quantifies the change in the 
estimator of the aggregate doubtful assets ratio and in the debt at risk in a scenario with a fall 
in GDP similar to that in 19936. The results indicate that, despite the rise in the two leading 
indicators of risk, the doubtful assets ratio would stand at levels similar to those at the begin-
ning of this decade and well below the credit risk levels at the beginning of the 1990s (Chart 
2.14.B). At a more qualitative level, these results become more persuasive when one consid-
ers the process of continuous improvement in risk measurement and management at deposit 
institutions.
Half of the balance sheet of Spanish insurance companies is invested in debt securities (50.3% 
in September 2006), and the weight of equity securities and fixed investments is small (5.5% 
and 2.4%, respectively). In non-life insurance companies, however, investment in equity secu-
rities amounted to 8.6% while fixed investments accounted for 5.5% in December 20057. 
Notable in life insurance companies is the weight of investments derived from unit linked poli-
cies (11%), in which the risk is assumed by the policyholder.
Despite the weight of debt securities, recent years have seen an increase in other investment 
(e.g. structured products), which account for 10.8% of total assets. They are the most notice-
able in the insurance subsidiaries of credit institutions, probably because these groups are 
more used to handling more complex structures.
The weight of debt securities means that the level of interest rates is a highly significant factor 
in the performance of the segment. Hence a higher interest rate scenario offers investment 
opportunities with greater returns and thus enables the companies to offer more competitive 
products. The longer time horizon of investments and the need to match them with liabilities 
reduces the impact of potential rises in interest rates. Furthermore, since the weight of public-
sector issuers has diminished relative to that of private-sector issuers, credit risk will become 
a more significant element of management.
The domestic and international stock markets (Chapter 1) have, apart from certain bouts of 
volatility, performed favourably. Even if there were to be an adverse movement in the stock 
market, the low weight of equity securities suggests that the impact would be moderate. It can 
also be expected that the impact of potentially adverse developments in the real estate market 
would be moderate, given the low weight of fixed investments.
A cause for concern in the international insurance sector is the possibility that bird flu may 
become a pandemic since, whatever its probability may be, the impact could be extremely 
grave. Terrorism, natural disasters, health-related risks and longevity are other sources of con-
cern for the large international insurance companies (Chart 2.15). Some of these risks particu-
larly affect reinsurance companies. In Spain catastrophic risks and terrorism, among others, 
are covered by the Consorcio de Compensación de Seguros (Insurance Compensation Con-
sortium).
2.2 Other financial 
market participants
2.2.1 INSURANCE COMPANIES
The higher weight of debt 
securities …
… means that the level of 
interest rates is a highly 
significant factor for the 
insurance segment …
… as compared with the 
lower weight of the stock 
and real estate markets.
At international level, causes 
for concern are the risk of 
pandemics, terrorism and 
natural catastrophes, 
among other risks with an 
impact on insurance 
companies …
6. For a more detailed analysis, see Documento de Trabajo (Working Paper) No. 0622, “Morosidad de la deuda empre-
sarial bancaria en España, 1992-2003” (Deliquency in corporate bank debt in Spain, 1992-2003), Banco de España, by 
S. Ruano and V. Salas. 7. In each case, the latest information available at the date of this report is used, whether it be 
publicly available information from the Directorate General of Insurance and Pension Funds or estimates of the ICEA 
(Investigación Cooperativa entre Entidades Aseguradoras y Fondos de Pensiones — Co-operative Research between 
Insurance Companies and Pension Funds), an association representing around 90% of premiums in the sector.
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The regulatory changes (IFRSs and Solvency II) also pose challenges for the institutions. 
IFRSs, which are now used in preparing the consolidated financial statements of companies 
whose securities are listed in a regulated EU market and which will foreseeably be extended 
to the entire sector, involve, first, a considerable effort in adaptation by the institutions and, 
second, a certain element of additional volatility. The Solvency II rules, which will foreseeably 
come into force in the EU in 2010, pose new capital requirements more closely attuned to the 
level of risk. Their likely impact will be improved risk management and greater market disci-
pline. Insurance companies will have to adapt to the change, particularly in regard to risk 
management.
Assessing the sector’s resilience in the event of the crystallisation of potential difficulties calls 
for an analysis of its profitability and solvency. The ICEA forecast for life insurance is growth of 
9.8% in premiums for 2006, while the expected rise in non-life insurance is 6.5%. These in-
creases exceed 2006 insurance sector inflation by 3.5%.
The favourable economic situation, the growth of multi-risk insurance in the non-life branch 
(linked to the real estate sector) and automobile insurance help to explain the performance of 
premiums. However, automobile insurance is growing less than in other years and more 
slowly than the total number of vehicles, largely reflecting the strong competition in the sec-
tor.
The estimated coverage of the solvency margin for 2006 is high both in the life branch (181%) 
and in the non-life branch (398%), although the direction of movement differs from that in 
2005: a decrease in life (20 pp) and an increase in non-life (30 pp). The ROE of Spanish insur-
ance companies (around 20% in 2006), which has trended favourably in recent years, exceeds 
the yield on long-term Spanish public debt. An international comparison based on the latest 
available data shows that Spanish life insurance companies have solvency margins around the 
EU-15 average and a slightly lower profitability (Charts 2.16.A and B). By contrast, non-life and 
mixed insurance companies have profitabilities well above the European average, while their 
solvency margins are somewhat lower, albeit growing over time.
In Spain, the insurance subsidiaries of commercial and savings banks represented around 
35% of the sector’s total assets in December 2005 (50% in life, 37% in mixed insurance and 
6% in non-life). The situation of difficulty in the insurance sector could directly affect the bank-
ing sector. However, the weight of insurance companies in Spanish banking groups is very low, 
and their profitability and solvency situation is, at aggregate level, in line with that of the sector 
as a whole.
… and the challenges 
posed by IFRSs and 
Solvency II.
Growth of premiums …
… and a good solvency 
situation ...
… including the insurance 
subsidiaries of credit 
institutions.
RANKING
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SOURCES: Reports of several international insurance companies and Banco de España. 
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The 2006 figures show that the net assets of collective investment institutions (CIIs) grew by 
6.7%, with mutual funds (weight of 78.5%) being the least buoyant (their net assets grew by 
4.1%). The factor explaining this increase is profitability, particularly that of equity funds, against 
a background of favourable international financial markets. By contrast, redemptions grew 
more than subscriptions (26.2% against 11.1%). Meanwhile, pension funds grew by 11.4% 
thanks to the yields achieved, since net contributions remained practically unchanged (0.7%).
Some of the trends that have driven collective investment in Spain in recent years persist, such 
as the favourable economic climate, but others have tended to taper off, such as the tax ad-
vantages offered by these products, since the personal income tax reform largely equalised 
the taxation of the different instruments. Furthermore, against a background of higher interest 
rates, and of persistent growth of banking activity, the competition posed by products that can 
be considered to be alternatives (deposits with credit institutions) is a factor to be taken into 
account by the collective investment sector. To the challenges derived from these develop-
ments must be added the risks inherent in the financial markets, certain of which persist 
(Chapter 1).
The new CII Regulations of November 2005 have presented new opportunities to the mutual 
funds sector, particularly by permitting hedge funds to be set up in Spain. There are risks of an 
overall nature associated with the hedge funds industry (Chapter 1), but the amount so far 
estimated to be managed by these institutions is limited, although greater activity is expected 
from the so-called funds of hedge funds, since this is the vehicle via which small investors will 
gain access to this market. Seven hedge funds and 14 funds of funds had been authorised by 
April 2007.
The private equity business, particularly leveraged buy-out transactions, has seen strong de-
velopment in Europe, including Spain, in the last few years. This development is largely related 
to the ample liquidity in the markets and to the search for higher returns by investors.
2.2.2 OTHER FINANCIAL 
MARKET PARTICIPANTS
The tax reform and 
competition with other 
banking products are 
challenges facing the 
collective investment sector.
Hedge funds …
… and private equity …
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From the standpoint of financial stability, concern focuses on the high leverage that character-
ises this business and on the role of credit institutions as providers of funds. In this respect, 
institutions offer a significant level of financing at the time the transaction is carried out and 
seek as rapidly as possible to find others willing to take a share of this debt in the secondary 
market or via syndication. The risk for the institution is not only that it will make errors in as-
sessing the project, but also that it will be unable to place the debt in the market. However, the 
available information indicates that these risks are still limited in comparison with the total ex-
posure of the European banking sector. Moreover, Spanish institutions do not usually take part 
in the initial stages of the financing and they participate in high credit quality debt tranches.
… are increasingly active 
segments that must be 
monitored closely.
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3 Analysis of financial infrastructures
The systematic coverage for the first time in the FSR of the operational and institutional infra-
structure of the Spanish financial system calls for some conceptual framing in this connection. 
The soundness of financial systems and, therefore, the ability to withstand systemic risks, 
hinges crucially on certain institutional and material elements that underpin the system’s or-
ganisation. Under the umbrella of infrastructures of a potentially systemic scope, the Financial 
Stability Forum lists the following: the insolvency regime; the accounting regime; the govern-
ance framework; the control and auditing system; the completeness of financial markets; the 
functionality of such markets; and clearing and settlement systems.
Against this background, the aim of this chapter of the FSR is to draw together information on 
and assessments of the state of specific aspects relating to infrastructures of systemic impor-
tance. To this end, some broad reflections follow on the relationship between clearing and 
settlement infrastructures and financial stability, and on the MiFID.
Value transfers using payment systems in Spain account daily for around 35% of GDP, high-
lighting the systemic significance of clearing and settlement systems. Moreover, any malfunc-
tion would affect a large range of transactions: operations on stock and debt markets, inter-
bank transactions, retail payment transactions instrumented through transfers, direct debits, 
cheques and cards, among others.
The most extreme manifestation of the systemic risk inherent in clearing and settlement infra-
structures would be the dislocation of the value circuit flowing through such infrastructures. 
The term dislocation refers to discontinuity in the functioning of the circulation of value for one 
of two reasons: either because such circulation has ground to a halt, or because, if not, com-
pliance with other crucial standards has been subverted. The analysis of payment and clearing 
systems from the perspective of financial stability thus condenses, in its most basic essence, 
into containing the risk of dependence on a limited number of settlement services suppliers or 
the functioning of inadequate incentives leading to blockages in the value circuit or to situa-
tions of contagion (in the broadest sense of the term).
The Law of Autonomy of the Banco de España lays down the central bank’s responsibilities in 
respect of payment systems. In addition to the power to regulate and manage payment sys-
tems, the Banco de España is also responsible for ensuring that authorised systems in Spain 
operate securely. It is worth highlighting two facts in this respect: the supervisory powers of the 
Banco de España do not extend to securities settlement systems and its conduct in respect 
of payment systems is not exclusively guided by financial stability criteria.
In any event, the conduct of the Banco de España in the field of payment systems is under-
pinned by the common reference framework provided by generally accepted international 
standards. Here, the Financial Stability Forum attributes a pivotal role to the “Core Principles for 
Systemically Important Payment Systems” issued by the Basel Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems (CPSS). In the securities settlement field, the international benchmark by 
which the interaction between securities and fund settlement is judged is defined by the “Rec-
ommendations for Securities Settlement Systems”, jointly issued by the CPSS and the IOSCO.
Generally, these standards do not impinge on the corporate or technical solutions to which the 
provision of settlement services responds. It is this potential compatibility of the risk standards 
As indicated in previous 
FSRs, the stability of the 
financial system depends on 
the soundness of its 
infrastructures.
Clearing and settlement 
systems
Containing dislocation risk in 
the large-scale value circuit ...
… warrants surveillance of 
payment systems and 
securities settlement 
systems.
The international principles 
informing oversight are 
compatible with different 
payment services provision 
models.
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with alternative forms of systems which, ultimately, allows the authorities to seek to provide for 
the compatibility of specific financial integration, market structure or other goals, besides safe-
guarding the security under which such systems operate.
In accordance with the foregoing considerations, it is not surprising that the discussion of in-
frastructure in relation to clearing and settlement systems should demand that priorities be 
established. Specifically, the distinction between systemic and non-systemic platforms means 
that the attention accorded in this FSR to retail payment systems-related issues will be less 
than that to large-value payments.
A similar approach advises that the discussion of financial integration and/or market structure 
policies be structured in terms of the influence on the procedures and institutions by which the 
CPSS principles are substantiated. In practice, the degree of restriction this involves in relation to 
the specific content of financial stability will be relatively limited because major projects always 
entail substantial reforms and challenges. Illustrative of this are the influence of the European fi-
nancial integration process in the formulation of the CPSS and CPSS/IOSCO principles and some 
challenges currently posed by the progress in financial integration that Target2 represents.
Regarding the first aspect, it should be recalled that the prospect of EMU spurred, during the 
90s, the process of reform of payment systems and their upgrading to the requirements im-
posed by increasing capital flows. EMU would require a particularly efficient and secure pay-
ments mechanism that would underpin the single monetary policy and provide for greater cross-
border capital flows. The response to these requirements was provided by Target, a European 
network of real-time gross settlement payment systems that brought about the partial integra-
tion of European large-value payments via the harmonisation of the essentials of the various 
sub-systems and interlinking arrangements. Against this background of payment system reform 
in a large number of CPSS member countries, the resulting principles laid down by this Commit-
tee were inevitably influenced strongly by developments in the euro area countries.
Protection against default by the largest debtor in the system, the central risk-related objective 
in the Lamfalussy criteria formulated in the early 90s, thus gave way to much more demanding 
and secure stability criteria. One of the biggest quid pro quos for this greater level of security 
was the higher liquidity requirements evidenced by real-time gross settlement systems. In this 
respect, Target proved particularly burdensome given the partial integration to which, from a 
regional standpoint, its design had to be tailored.
In this setting, Target2 is seen as a continuity solution on the road to a greater level of integra-
tion of domestic large-value payment systems. Once it comes on stream1, this greater level of 
integration will take the following specific forms: effective harmonisation of services provided 
to users; achievement of savings in liquidity for institutions that decide to manage their liquid-
ity jointly; and greater levels of robustness and the maintenance of decentralised relations 
between the national central banks and the system’s member institutions. In step with these 
ambitious goals, the change in the profile of the systemic risks Target2 poses is also consider-
able, as is explained below.
The attainment of savings in liquidity in Target2 necessitated the setting in place of the so-
called virtual accounts, which allow several settlement accounts of different institutions to be 
grouped together. The purpose of this aggregation is to enable each of the multiple members 
of the virtual account to meet payments during the session, up to the amount available in the 
Interest from the financial 
stability standpoint relates 
to the implications of the 
models in terms of risk and 
not so much the models 
themselves.
European monetary 
integration has boosted 
real-time gross settlement.
Target2 will complete the 
integration process …
… and will introduce 
savings in liquidity 
requirements by means of 
virtual accounts.
1. Transition periods aside, Target 2 is scheduled to commence operating in November 2007.
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overall accounts making up the virtual account. This saving in resources that makes it possible 
to share a single liquidity balance ends at the close of the session, when the different accounts 
making up the virtual account have to be balanced.
The intra-day multilateral netting that the virtual accounts mechanism refers to is a new feature 
that will test the legal and operational institutions that have to ensure the unshakable goals of 
financial stability. To this end, the mechanisms envisaged in the transposition of the Directive 
on financial guarantees are crucial as first, they allow the use of cash accounts as collateral, 
and second, they provide for robust netting agreements between the institutions participating 
in a virtual account, as the management of incidents may adhere to the content of the agree-
ments, even if public tender situations arise.
The definition of the institutions that can be grouped in a virtual account chiefly follows the 
consolidated group criterion in IFRS 272. Further, the ECB Governing Council acknowledged 
in 2006 that networks of savings banks and credit co-operatives could also group their liquid-
ity subject to certain conditions.
With regard to system robustness, Target2 marks a significant step forward from Target. This 
advance is the natural counterpart to the greater level of requirements that may be demanded 
of a fully integrated system. The technical architecture underpinning the Target2 integrated 
solution has given priority attention to the continuity of activity under extreme circumstances.
Target2 uses the resources provided by the three central banks which sponsored this initia-
tive3, promoting risk control and system robustness. Each of the three regions involved in the 
provision of the services Target2 offers has two separate installations, though they are con-
nected in synchronous mode in order to ensure the resumption of activity should one of them 
be cut off. The first two zones, respectively managed by the German and Italian central banks, 
alternatively provide settlement and accounting functionalities in accordance with a regular 
rotating schedule. Were any incident to affect the two installations in a single region, an asyn-
chronous copy procedure for the information would allow the second zone rapidly to resume 
service. The third zone (Banque de France) manages the client relations system and the stor-
age of relevant information. Overall, the shared management arrangements described should 
provide for the accommodation of extreme situations that might affect the continuity of activity. 
Moreover, the joint nature of the initiative will allow the robustness of the system to be sus-
tained over time, despite the large-scale investment in maintenance and enhancements that 
major information technology projects require.
The turbulence on world financial markets in late February highlighted the speed of contagion 
across markets and the importance of volatility-stabilising mechanisms. One particular event 
was illustrative of how crucial the robustness of market infrastructure can be in this connec-
tion. On 27 February, while equity prices were falling worldwide (Chapter I), a bottleneck oc-
curred as the company responsible for compiling the Dow Jones indices failed to process 
price information over the space of an hour. As a result of the distortion to market transpar-
ency, the sharp correction in prices already under way led to more acute discontinuity than 
would otherwise have been the case. Against this background, the activation of the so-called 
trading collars on the New York Stock Exchange saw arbitrage activity on the index grind to a 
halt, thereby contributing to some stabilising of the market situation.
The level of integration of 
Target2 poses particular 
demands in terms of 
operational risks.
Market stabilisers
2. This criterion does not presume that holders of accounts making up the virtual account hold them in different central 
banks. 3. Consolidating Target was initially conceived as a gradual process in which, in any event, there would be more 
harmonisation than in the initial system. However, the initiative by the German, French and Italian central banks, com-
bined with the demands of European industry, ultimately prompted a far more intense consolidation.
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The MiFID, which comes into force in November this year, falls within the framework of the 
broad regulatory changes made under the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), which has 
the ultimate aim of building a single financial market in the European Union.
The benefits of greater financial market integration, recognised years ago by EU public policy-
makers, are related to the creation of markets that are more efficient, competitive, innovative 
and, in short, more able to contribute to greater economic growth.
From this ambitious perspective, the MiFID proposes an in-depth reform of the 1993 Invest-
ment Services Directive. This reform has two basic aims. First, acknowledging the growing 
complexity and development of financial services and instruments and of trading systems, it 
prepares the ground for new organised trading systems, which will heighten competition. In-
sofar as this alters the principle of concentration of orders in markets, the MiFID requires the 
institutions to guarantee to customers the best possible execution of their orders.
Second, in relation to the greater complexity and sophistication of financial services, the MiFID 
recognises the need to protect investors to a greater extent. This has led to an extensive set 
of requirements for financial service providers. These requirements relate to their internal struc-
ture and, in addition, to the standards of conduct to be upheld. The former require, inter alia, 
adequate regulatory compliance and the proper management of risks and conflicts of interest. 
The latter are based on the classification of customers as retail or professional and here too 
the reform is far-reaching. This classification leads to a series of requirements which, espe-
cially in the case of retail customers, call for assessing the knowledge of investors and examin-
ing whether the product suits their profile and their aims.
The scale of all these changes, which is implicit in the gestation process of the MiFID approved 
in 2004 and developed in more detail through two additional provisions in 2006, will entail 
considerable efforts of adaptation for investment service providers, among them credit institu-
tions. Indeed, proper adaptation exploiting the full potential of this directive will entail changes 
organisation-wide. However, it should be noted that the Spanish institutions are not starting 
from scratch in addressing this challenge, since they already have in place certain structures 
and procedures that can probably be adapted to the new requirements.
Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive  
(MiFID)
The MiFID falls within the 
framework of the set of 
regulatory changes 
designed to move towards a 
single financial market in the 
EU, enabling new organised 
trading systems …
… and fostering better 
protection of investors.
The scale of the changes 
will require financial service 
providers to make an effort 
to adapt to them.
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